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Summary: 
 
The current literature on non-cooperative and strategic groundwater extraction assumes user behavior that 
conforms to the highly stylized assumption of time-additive separability of the individual’s objective 
criterion. This paper examines how the measured gains to management changes when this assumption is 
relaxed in favor of a recursive utility specification that takes path-dependency into account in modeling 
the behavior under both the non-cooperative and central management regimes. Application of this 
framework to the empirical case of Kern County, California shows that the difference in measured 
management gains is significantly larger than that which is measured under the assumption of time-
additive separability.  The paper also shows how the traditional method of calculating the benefits over 
time must be modified in order to properly account for these management gains.  
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1.  Overview 
1.1    Introduction 
The Natural Resource Economics literature on Common Property externalities in 
groundwater extraction is both rich in theoretical and empirical treatments, beginning with the 
article of Gisser and Sanchez (1980) which examined the loss of efficiency that occurs when a 
groundwater aquifer moves from a sole-owner extraction regime to one in which there is 
competition in pumping. Various other authors have addressed the efficiency problems that arise 
under competitive in groundwater pumping (Allen and Gisser, 1984; Feinerman and Knapp, 
1983; Kim et al., 1989), but Negri’s 1989 article placed the problem squarely in the realm of 
applied differential game theory. Other natural resource problems, such as that of fishing 
(Levhari and Mirman, 1980; Cave, 1987; Fisher and Mirman, 1992) have been characterized 
within the context of dynamic and differential games, however Negri’s article was the first to 
characterize groundwater problems as such and to describe the strategic externality that arises 
from the dynamic gaming of the competing agents. Dixon (1991) studied the possibility for 
trigger-strategies giving rise to an equilibrium in groundwater extraction, while Provencher and 
Burt (1993) re-cast Negri’s problem within a dynamic programming context, and went further to 
describe how risk might introduce yet another type of externality into the problem. 
While these authors have examined the losses that arise from non-cooperative 
groundwater extraction in some detail, they all maintain a rather severe assumption on inter-
temporal behavior that is widely maintained in economic models of dynamic behavior – namely, 
that of time-additive separability of the objective criterion. Following the original suggestion of 
Koopmans (1960), recent contributions to the literature have begun to examine the implications 
of relaxing this rather severe behavioral restriction on the inter-temporal felicity function, to Msangi  4  Gains to Groundwater Management 
allow for more generalized inter-temporal specifications, such as the iso-elastic intertemporal 
utility aggregator suggested by Epstein and Zin (1989, 1991). Among the few papers that have 
examined the implications of introducing recursive utility specifications in the context of natural 
resource management are those of Knapp and Olson (1996) and Howitt et al. (2005). However, 
neither of these papers go beyond the single agent case and deal with the issue of non-
cooperative or strategic resource extraction behavior.   
  In this paper, we use the well-studied example of Kern County, California, to characterize 
the strategic interaction between two players pumping from the same aquifer. Several authors 
(Feinerman and Knapp, 1983; Dixon, 1991) have used this empirical example to illustrate the 
gains to groundwater management, and conjunctive use management (Knapp and Olson, 1996), 
while maintaining the assumption of time-additive separability in the objective criterion. By 
comparing the non-cooperative outcome to the central planner’s solution, with both recursive 
and non-recursive preferences, we demonstrate the extent to which the standard assumption of 
time-additive separability can affect the measured gains to resource usage coordination and 
management. Further policy insight into groundwater management might also be gained, once 
we observe how the potential gains to management change with the relaxation of this behavioral 
assumption.   
  The rest of this paper is designed as follows.  Following a brief description of the studies 
that have been done on groundwater management in Kern County, and a summary of their 
results, we present the dynamic game model that illustrates the strategic behavior between 
economic agents pumping from the same aquifer. The dynamic game will then be presented 
within in a recursive utility formulation, in order to illustrate the particular features of interest for 
this study.  The section which follows compares the gains to groundwater management under Msangi  5  Gains to Groundwater Management 
both time-additive separability as well as under recursive preferences, using the central planner’s 
problem, as a benchmark of efficiency, under its corresponding formulations. This section is 
followed by a discussion of the results and their policy implications for the management of 
groundwater in Kern County, and a final section concludes the paper.  
 
1.2   The Literature on Groundwater Management in Kern County, California 
In the economic literature on water resources management, Kern County, California, has 
provided fertile ground for cultivating theoretical and methodological ideas on the optimal 
management of surface and groundwater resources. While this paper focuses specifically on 
groundwater management, the literature that has examined water management in Kern County 
has also considered the optimal conjunctive use of groundwater resources with stochastic surface 
water supplies, which has broadened the range of policy options and management issues to 
consider.  
Beginning with the paper of Feinerman and Knapp (1983), which forms the basis of this 
paper, Kern County was transformed into an experimental laboratory for the economic analysis 
of groundwater management, and for testing the magnitude of the gains to centralized optimal 
control of the underlying aquifer. In this paper, the authors examined the sensitivity of 
management gains to model specification, and also tested several alternative policy instruments 
to see how the welfare gains they generated compared to the gains realized under centralized 
management of the aquifer. In their study, they found that the realized gains of centralized 
management were less than ten percent, and that other types of economic instruments might 
achieve the same ends, albeit with varying consequences for welfare distribution. The 
conclusions of the paper echoed, to an extent, the earlier statements by Gisser and Sanchez Msangi  6  Gains to Groundwater Management 
(1980), that the gains to centralized management may not be that large, especially when one 
takes the costs of management into account – which are rarely quantified in any economic 
analysis of natural resource management.  
The next detailed analysis of Kern County was done by Knapp and Olson (1995), when they 
examined the conjunctive use of both surface and groundwater resources under uncertainty, in 
order to expand the palette of policy options available – such as artificial recharge. In this paper, 
the authors expanded on the work of Tsur and Graham-Tomasi (1991) and Provencher and Burt 
(1993) to examine how management options for conjunctive use change when one considers 
artificial recharge of the aquifer from a surface source which is stochastic in nature. In their 
study, they also found that the gains to groundwater management are somewhat small, and that 
they are affected by the degree of risk-neutrality of the decision-maker. In particular, they noted 
that the gains that are realized from groundwater management may be increased under risk 
aversion. This statement speaks directly to the impact that behavioral assumptions have on the 
measured gains to management, and to the importance of taking them into serious consideration, 
when attempting to conduct any empirical analysis of natural resource management under 
uncertainty.  
The role of decision-maker preferences in dynamic economic was followed up further in the 
paper of Knapp and Olson (1996), which featured Kern County as a brief empirical example, 
among other examples of natural resource management. In this paper, the authors applied the 
recursive utility framework to a variety of natural resource management problems, to 
demonstrate the impact of relaxing the assumption of time-additive separability on the resulting 
decision-rules. While the sensitivity of the results to preference specification – both in terms of 
inter-temporal substitutability and risk aversion – were explored, no explicit calculations were Msangi  7  Gains to Groundwater Management 
made to show their effect on the realized gains to management. This is the issue that is addressed 
in this paper, within a deterministic setting, so as to isolate the effect of inter-temporal 
substitutability on management gains, and to show its sensitivity to this parameter more clearly.     
Finally, the paper of Knapp et al. (2003) looked at Kern County within the context of out-of-
basin water transfers, and evaluated the operation of a possible water market, and its impacts on 
groundwater resources within the basin. This analysis was done using a standard specification of 
a dynamic economic model, with time-additive separability built into the objective criterion, so 
as to give more focus to the policy questions, rather than to the methodological components of 
the analysis. While they did find centralized management helped to mitigate the negative impacts 
of out-of-basin transfers and surface water cutbacks, the overall effect on net annual benefits was 
still found to be small. Once again, the policy laboratory of Kern County offers little 
contradiction to the original assertion of Gisser and Sanchez (1980) that the gains to centralized 
management are small, especially when compared to the potential cost of implementing it.  
  With this background literature in mind, we now proceed to examine if the introduction 
of recursive preferences into the analysis of groundwater management will have a significant 
impact on the gains that can be realized from centralized control. In the next section, the strategic 
interactions between two players pumping, non-cooperatively, from the Kern County Aquifer 
will be described, in detail, so as to lay out the theoretical basis for our empirical investigation.  
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2. Dynamic Game of Groundwater Pumping in Kern County  
 
2.1 Overview of Dynamic Game Model 
In this section we present a simplified dynamic game model to represent the strategic 
interaction between N identical players who are pumping from the Kern County aquifer, in a 
non-cooperative fashion. In this model, recharge is treated as deterministic, and the decisions of 
each of the N players are made under certainty. The basic structure of the model follows the 
formulation of Feinerman and Knapp (1983).  
The objective criterion of each of the N players is quadratic, with the marginal pumping 




iiii B wa wb w e h w = ⋅−⋅−⋅ (2.1.1) 
where  and bare, respectively, the intercept and slope of the demand curve for water, and are 
identical for each player. The parameter ‘e’ is also common to both players, and is the unit cost 
of energy used in pumping groundwater for every foot of lift from the groundwater table. The 
equation of motion for depth-to-groundwater  is given by the expression 
a
() h
  (( 1 ) ) ii hh wNw r γ
+
− = ++ − −  (2.1.2) 
where  is the depth to groundwater in the next period, and which evolves from the current 





and   for the other N-1 players) and recharge into the aquifer ( i − r ). The notation in (2.1.2) is 
condensed, with γ and r  representing the translation of volumetric aquifer recharge and net 
groundwater withdrawal, into units of lift, according to the definitions Msangi  9  Gains to Groundwater Management 
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In these expressions, θ  represents the deep percolation into the aquifer, while A represents the 
areal extent of the aquifer, and  is its specific yield. Recharge is given in terms of total inflow 
into the aquifer,
s
I , a base annual level of recharge  , and a calibrating parameter  ˆ r ξ . The values 
of the model parameters are contained in Table 1, in the Appendix A of the paper. 
  
Taken together, we can now write the structure of the dynamic game problem for player 
i, as follows 
  () ( ) { }
1
2 max ( ( 1) )
i
ii
ii i i i w Vh a w b we h w Vh w N w r βγ − =⋅ − ⋅ − ⋅ ++ + − −  (2.1.4) 
whereβ is the common discount rate for all N players and  ( ) V i is the maximized value of the 
dynamic game problem, for each player, beginning with the current level of groundwater lift (h), 
and proceeding under the assumption that actions taken in subsequent periods are done optimally 
with respect to the groundwater lift in each period. This recursive relationship linking the 
implied optimality of behavior from period-to-period captures the essence of Bellman’s 
“Principle of Optimality” (Bellman, 1957), and holds within the context of a strategic game 
played dynamically by two (or more) players.  
The equilibrium concept used in this paper is based on the definition of a Markov 
strategy – also known as a closed-loop or feedback strategy – described by Dockner et al. (2000), 
in which the actions of each player depend on the past history of the ‘game’ only through the 
current value of the stock (Lockwood, 1996). As both Lockwood and Tsutsui and Mino (1990) 
note, the Markov equilibrium is the most interesting case to examine, and is the appropriate one 
to consider, when agents cannot pre-commit to a path of future actions (as in the ‘open-loop’ Msangi  10  Gains to Groundwater Management 
case). Clemhout and Wan (1991), also concur with the opinion that feedback strategies are more 
suitable for the analysis of common-property resource games, and as such, we do not consider 
any ‘open-loop’ equilibria in this paper, as other authors have done (Reinganum and Stokey, 
1985; Negri, 1989; Rubio and Casino, 2002; Caputo and Lueck, 2003). The Markov equilibrium 
that is characterized in this paper is sub-game perfect, by construction, due to the fact that each 
player is solving a discrete-time dynamic programming problem which, by definition of the 
principle of optimality, ensures that each player’s actions are optimal in each sub-period of the 
game, given the actions of the other player(s). Since the dynamic programming problem (and, 
hence, the resulting solution) of each player is independent of time, the optimal value functions 
and equilibrium policy functions will also be time-independent (autonomous) – which makes the 
resulting equilibrium strategy stationary, Markov and sub-game perfect.  
The solution method that is used to obtain the stationary Markov equilibrium for this 
problem differs from the continuous-time approach commonly employed by authors in the 
literature who solve infinite-horizon differential game problems using the continuous-time 
optimal control approach (Mehlmann, 1988; Dockner et al., 2000). We adopt a discrete-time 
dynamic programming approach similar to that of Levhari and Mirman (1980) and Eswaran and 
Lewis (1984), and adapted by Negri (1990) to the groundwater pumping problem, in order to 
obtain a recursive relationship that describes the evolution of the parameters of each player’s 
carry-over value function for groundwater stock, towards its infinite-horizon value. This allow 
one to, numerically, obtain the exact solution to the problem, and verify that the derived infinite-
horizon value function is consistent with the implied policy function that we obtain from the 
Euler (first-order) conditions of the dynamic problem.  Msangi  11  Gains to Groundwater Management 
For the sake of space, the full derivation of the infinite-horizon value function will not be 
shown, in this paper. The functional form, however is given as follows 
  () ( ) ( )
2
Vh a eh a eh =+ − ⋅+ − ⋅ AB C  (2.1.5) 
where the constants A, B and C are a function of all the parameters of the problem, and are 
found by computing a stationary value from a value-iteration process using  the ‘equation of 
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where the constants  1 ϕ  and  2 ϕ  are also functions of the parameters, and defined as  























 (2.1.7)   
at any stage, k, in the value iteration process. Numerically, this analytical expression can be 
approximated using orthogonal polynomial projection techniques (Judd, 1998), that are 
commonly employed in solving dynamic economic problems. Researchers have begun  to rely 
more heavily on numerical methods to solving dynamic problems, as an alternative to adopting 
the more restrictive assumptions of the linear-quadratic formulation (Miranda and Fackler, 
2002), and have applied them successfully to the solution of dynamic games, as well (Rui and 
Miranda, 1996).  
This numerical approximation to the infinite-horizon carry-over value function takes the 
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algorithm, and  ( ) n x φ is a basis function for the orthogonal terms of the Chebychev polynomial 
we employ. Each basis function is defined over a domain x, which is restricted to the [-1,+1] 
interval, and onto which the state variable h
+ must be mapped. Further description of other types 
of orthogonal polynomials and of the numerical algorithm that we implement to find the 
polynomial coefficients are deferred to the more detailed discussion in Judd (1998), Miranda and 
Fackler (1999, 2002), and Howitt et al.(2002).  
 
2.2 Dynamic Game in Groundwater with Recursive Preferences 
The dynamic game model that we now present exhibits similar non-cooperative behavior 
between the players, but relaxes the restrictive assumption of time-additive separability in their 
respective objective criteria. Using the iso-elastic formulation of the recursive Kreps and Porteus 
preferences, following Epstein and Zin (1991), we can embed the quadratic form of the net 
benefit function used in (2.1.1) within a nested functional that also includes the carry-over 
benefits, according to the following expression 
  () () ()
1
() 1 () ()
ii i
ii Uw Bw Uw
α
i
α α ββ +




where  , generically, represents the ‘felicity’ or benefit realized by the agent, as a function 
of  the immediate net benefit in the current period, and the carry-over benefit   realized in 
the next. By implication of the recursive nature of this formulation, the benefits in the next 
period also embed those realized in all subsequent periods, as well. The CES-formulation of this 






α determines the rate of substitution that occurs. β remains the subjective 
discount factor of the agent, while α is defined as a constant of ‘resistance’ to inter-temporal Msangi  13  Gains to Groundwater Management 
substitution, which is less than one and non-zero. Using this parameter (α ), Epstein and Zin 








, which gives it 
a more intuitive interpretation – a high value representing a reluctance to trade-off benefits 
between adjacent periods (i.e. a high level of ‘resistance’ to inter-temporal substitution).  
Embedding this new formulation of the objective function within our groundwater 
extraction problem, we can now write the structure of the dynamic game problem for player i, as 
follows 
  () () () ()
1
1
2 () m a x 1 ( ( 1 ) )
i
i i
ii i i i w Vh a w b w e h w Vh w N w r
α α α ββ γ −
⎡⎤ = − ⋅−⋅−⋅ + + + − − ⎢⎥ ⎣⎦
(2.2.2) 
The recursive relationship of optimal period-to-period behavior implied by Bellman’s Principle 
of Optimality is maintained for each of the players in the strategic game, and the interpretation of 
the optimal carry-over value function  remains unchanged from the time-additive separable 
case. However, given the more complex nature of the objective functional, the analytic solution 
of the problem becomes even more challenging.  
( )
i Vh
As before, a recursive system of equations can be derived and simulated to give the 
infinite-horizon value function. Omitting the details of their derivation, we present the final 
functional form of the infinite-horizon value function below  
  () ( ) () ()
1
1
2 2 1 Vh h h h
α α α α
β ⎡ ⎤ =− +⋅ +⋅ + +⋅ ⎢ ⎥ ⎣ ⎦
AB C D EF  (2.2.3) 
where the constants A, B, C and D are a function of all the parameters of the problem, and arise 
from a similar recursive scheme to that of (2.1.6). As before, we approximate it by a numerical 
scheme that has a polynomial representation similar to that used in the previous section, for the 
time-additive separable case.    Msangi  14  Gains to Groundwater Management 
 
  Figure 1 shows the results that are created by simulating the central planner’s model with 
recursive preferences (2.2.2) under a fixed discount rate of 5%. From this figure, we see that the 
inter-temporal substitution parameter (α ) has a pronounced effect on the extraction path, as seen 
from the levels of groundwater lift. In this figure, we can see that a more negative α  value 
(which implies a lower elasticity of inter-temporal substitution) causes the extraction profile to 
‘flatten’ out, such that the groundwater stock is not mined as heavily in the initial periods. The 
extraction path which takes place under time-additive separability (TAS) is the ‘envelope’ that 
defines the outer bound of behavior, and represents the least level of ‘resistance’ to inter-
temporal substitution
1, and in which the decision-maker is the most willing to forgo net benefits 
of consumption in the next period for the sake of realizing them sooner.  
Figure 2 shows the behavior of the model with strategic and non-cooperative extraction, 
under recursive preferences and an increasing number of players. As expected, the behavior of 
the model converges to that of the myopic extraction regime, as the number of players becomes 
large. Both Figures 3 and 4 show that the dynamic game model is affected in a similar way to the 
central planner’s model, when the elasticity of inter-temporal substitution is changed. Even 
though both the 2 and 10-player examples show that the degree of groundwater mining is 
bounded by the TAS case, the profiles become less distinguishable, as the number of players 
increases, and the strategic behavior of the players converges to that of myopic extraction. Negri 
(1989) showed this result, analytically, as  , and we can also make a similar argument, 
based on the derived infinite-horizon policy rule for pumping as a function of depth. A brief 
exposition is given in Appendix B, for the benefit of the reader.  
N →∞
                                                 
1 Using the definition of Epstein and Zin (1991), the elasticity of inter-temporal substitution becomes infinite in the 
case where α=1, which corresponds to time-additive separability.  Msangi  15  Gains to Groundwater Management 
3.  Measuring the Gains to Groundwater Management  
  In this section, we define a benchmark of allocative efficiency between the  economic 
agents, with the groundwater extraction problem of the central planner. The central planner’s 
solution will be derived under both time-additive separable and recursive preferences, so that the 
gains to management can be measured against the respective game solutions and compared. The 
difference between the gains to management will then be evaluated under varying degrees of 
inter-temporal substitutability, in order to better understand the importance of this parameter on 
the magnitude of management gains that are realized.  
N
 
3.1 Central Planning under Recursive and Non-recursive Preferences 
  The problem facing the central planner is that of maximizing the combined welfare of all 
agents drawing from the aquifer, and maximizing the joint net present value of benefits that 
accrue over the planning horizon for all players. If the central planner were to operate under the 


















=⋅ − ⋅ − ⋅ + + − ⎨⎬ ⎜
⎝⎠ ⎩⎭ ∑∑
⎞
⎟  (3.1.1) 
 where the inter-temporal optimization is carried out with respect to the pumping of all players in 
each period.  
  If, however, we were to relax the assumption of time-additive separability of the 











ii i i w
ii




⎡⎤ ⎛⎞ ⎛⎞ ⎛ ⎢⎥ =− ⋅ − ⋅ − ⋅ + + − ⎜ ⎜⎟ ⎜





 (3.1.2) Msangi  16  Gains to Groundwater Management 
which retains the same basic structure as that of the individual optimization programs in the non-
cooperative dynamic game formulation. Likewise, the functional form of the optimal carry-over 
value functions remains the same as that for the non-cooperative case, and can be derived in the 
similar fashion. The numerical approximations to these functions shall be employed in this 
paper, in order to compare the gains to management under both time-additive separability and 
recursive preferences of the objective criteria. The results of these numerical simulations will be 
presented in the next sub-section.    
 
3.2 Comparing the Gains to Management  
   Now we compare the computed gains to groundwater management under both the 
recursive and non-recursive utility specifications, to see the effect of relaxing the assumption of 
time-additive separability. The gains to management are normally computed by comparing the 
net present value of the stream of maximized benefits that accrue to the players under centralized 
management of the aquifer and under de-centralized, non-cooperative extraction. This has been 
the standard approach to evaluating any stream of net benefits that accrue over time as a result of 
resource extraction, and is based upon common accounting practices which calculate financial 
gain (or loss) of any stream benefits (or costs) on the basis of discounted values which represent 
foregone opportunities in alternative investments.  
In order to calculate the gains to management, we add the total net benefits of each player 
to its discounted value for each period along both the competitive and cooperative solution paths. 
By calculating the difference between the cumulative net benefits that accrue over the path of 
each extraction regime 
{ } { } { } { } ,, 11 1 ,, ,
tT tT tT tT CP Game CP Game
it it t t tt t ww hh
1 t
= == =
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we can measure the gains that would be realized under central groundwater management, by 
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⎦            (3.2.1) 
The percentage gains that we see in Table 2 match the values obtained by Feinerman and 
Knapp (1983), in their study of Kern County, California, when taken with respect to myopic 
extraction behavior – which is the only case they considered. Dixon (1991) considered the 
strategic extraction case in Kern County, and obtained percentage gains of close to 3.7%, which 
corresponds closely to the two-player level reported in Table 2. Furthermore, Dixon reported that 
the proportion of the management gains captured by strategic behavior is 75%, which also 
corresponds closely to the two-player results in this paper, and which is due to the fact that the 
closed-loop game, although non-cooperative in nature, still embodies forward-looking, dynamic 
behavior which accounts for a large proportion of the marginal user costs of resource extraction. 
As the number of players increases, however, the extent to which they can internalize the 
marginal user cost decreases, and their behavior approaches that of the myopically-extracting 
agent, as has been shown by Negri (1989), Provencher and Burt (1993).  
Many authors have reported very modest or non-existent gains to groundwater 
management, either under sole groundwater use (Gisser and Sanchez, 1980; Allen and Gisser, 
1984; Worthington et al., 1985; Nieswiadomy, 1985; Reichard, 1987) or within a conjunctive use 
setting (Knapp and Olson, 1995; Knapp et al., 2003). These results are summarized in Table 3, 
for comparison, and represent the gains to management as measured with respect to non-
cooperative and myopic extraction behavior. Msangi  18  Gains to Groundwater Management 
By adopting the recursive-utility specification of equation (3.1.2), for the social planner, 
we can evaluate the effect that relaxing the assumption of time-additive separability has on the 
measured gains to management. By varying the inter-temporal substitution parameter,α , we can 
then re-calculate the difference shown in (3.2.1) to see how the gains to management change 
with an increasing degree of resistance to inter-temporal substitution, both from the perspective 
of each player and of the social planner. By doing so, we obtain the results shown in Table 4, 
which show that the gains to management decrease as the elasticity of inter-temporal substitution 
decreases (i.e., as α  becomes more negative).  
Given the fact that Figure 1 showed the steady-state groundwater level under decreasing 
levels of the inter-temporal elasticity, these results seem somewhat paradoxical, as they suggest 
that things are worsening, when in fact the long-run sustainability of the aquifer seems to be 
further enhanced when the central planner’s inter-temporal preferences deviate farther from 
time-additive separability. The reasons for this apparent contradiction are revealed when we 
compare Figures 5 and 6, which show the difference between the stream of net benefits realized 
under central planning and myopic extraction, both in the absence and presence of discounting, 
respectively. From Figure 5 we see that in the early part of the extraction horizon, the net 
benefits that accrue to the pumpers under myopic extraction exceed those realized under central 
planning – making the gains to management negative. This is due to the fact that myopic 
pumpers mine the groundwater resource early on, ignoring the inevitable future rise in pumping 
costs, which eventually results in the long-run net benefits being lower than those realized under 
groundwater management.  In Figure 5, the long-run gains realized under groundwater 
management are shown to be much larger when the social planner’s preferences exhibit lower 
levels of inter-temporal elasticity, when reported in terms of their nominal value. However, when Msangi  19  Gains to Groundwater Management 
these values are discounted over time, the near-term losses begin to overwhelm the gains that are 
realized farther in the future under increasingly inelastic inter-temporal substitution, and the 
long-run benefits (in terms of lower pumping costs) are drastically under-stated, as seen in 
Figure 6.  
Considering that the net-present value from the stream of benefits over time corresponds 
to the time-additive calculation, below  












its incongruity with the nature of the social planner’s objective function becomes apparent, as the 
planner’s objective criterion is now no longer strictly time-additive in nature. To date, the 
groundwater management literature has only considered the time-additive separable case, and 
has used the discount factor () β  as the sole inter-temporal preference parameter of relevance. 
Given the more generalized framework of the iso-elastic recursive utility functional, the way in 
which we calculate gains over time may also need to be more generalized with respect to both 
the pure rate of time preference and the elasticity of inter-temporal substitution, so that the 
accounting of management gains that accrue over time remains consistent with the nature of the 
inter-temporal preferences embedded within the structure of the optimal program which defines 
the new benchmark of allocative efficiency.   
 
3.3 Re-Calculation of the Gains to Management 
In order to account for the gains to management in a way that is consistent with the 
functional form of the social planner’s objective criterion, we should evaluate the stream of 
benefits that accrue over time with respect to both the discount factor and the elasticity of inter-
temporal substitution. In order to do this, we propose the calculation scheme shown below 
  () ( )( )
1
1 1 tt t VN B N B
αα α ββ + ⎡ =− + ⎣
⎤
⎦  (3.3.1) 
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which shows the benefits in period t as a function of those that accrue from time t+1 forward, 
such that if we were to start from the last period t = T, the calculation for the last four periods can 
be written as   




33 2 1 111 TT T T T VN B N B N B N B
α α
α α
ααα α α ββ ββ ββ −− − −
⎡ ⎤ ⎛⎞
⎡⎤ ⎢ ⎥ ⎛⎞ ⎜⎟
⎡⎤ ⎢⎥ ⎢ ⎥ = − +− +− + ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ ⎣⎦ ⎜⎟ ⎢⎥ ⎢ ⎥ ⎜⎟ ⎝⎠ ⎣⎦ ⎜⎟ ⎢ ⎥ ⎝⎠ ⎣ ⎦
(3.3.2) 
This scheme can be extended, recursively, to include the entire planning horizon, starting from 
t=1, so that the accounting of benefits over time corresponds to the way in which the 
dynamically-optimizing social planner accounts for them at each point along the optimal 
consumption path.  
By adopting this scheme for both the calculation of benefits accruing to the groundwater 
users under myopic and centrally-managed extraction, we obtain the results shown in Table 5, 
which contrast sharply with those calculated previously. While the per-acre benefits appear in a 
different unit-of-measure than before
2, they values increase in a manner that is consistent with 
our intuitive belief that higher steady-state groundwater levels (and lower levels of lift) 
correspond to greater social, long-run benefits. Given that the recursive scheme in (3.3.2), 
corresponds to the summation below  











VN B T N B






=− + ⎨ ⎢⎥
⎣⎦ ⎩⎭ ∑
α
⎬  (3.3.3) 
the computed gains for the case where  1 α = will equal those obtained from the simple present-
value calculation when the sum of present-value net benefits in the first T-1 periods are divided 
by the factor () 1 β −
3.  
                                                 
2 They are now expressed in units of the utility function, rather than in monetary terms 
3 The reader can easily verify that the value of 8 utility units corresponds to the value given for the simple 
discounted sum, when divided by 1-β, for β = 0.952 (r = 5%). Msangi  21  Gains to Groundwater Management 
The results in that last column of Table 5 now show much larger percentage gains to 
centralized management than those that were shown in Table 3, which represent the results from 
studies that have all imposed the assumption of time-additive separability on the inter-temporal 
preferences of the decision-maker. Perhaps if we were to introduce a greater degree of 
groundwater modeling sophistication, following the suggestion of Brozovic (2002) and Brozovic 
et al. (2003), or by addressing the risk externalities that might be present when considering 
stochastic surface water supplies (Provencher and Burt, 1993) – the gains to management that are 
reported here might be weakened, somewhat. However, given the severe restrictions that time-
additive separability on inter-temporal behavior, it is likely that a more plausible set of inter-
temporal preferences for the central planner would create management gains that would remain 
sizeable, even under attenuation by the factors mentioned above. This will remain, however, a 
question for further empirical research.     
 
4. Conclusions 
In this paper, we have extended the basic dynamic groundwater extraction model of 
Feinerman and Knapp (1983) to incorporate both strategic behavior and variable degrees of 
‘resistance’ to inter-temporal substitution. By relaxing the assumption of time-additive 
separability in the model, we have found that the impact of changing the rate of inter-temporal 
substitution to have a significant effect on the path of groundwater extraction, under both central 
planning and non-cooperative and strategic extraction. Furthermore, when evaluating the gains to 
centralized groundwater management, we also found that changing the rate of inter-temporal 
substitution increases the realized gains to centralized groundwater management, provided that Msangi  22  Gains to Groundwater Management 
these gains are measured with a criterion which is consistent with the functional form of the 
objective criterion.  
While many authors, beginning with Gisser and Sanchez (1980), have asserted that the 
gains to management are small, compared to the potential costs of its implementation, they have 
restricted themselves to the time-additive separable case. Using the empirical case of Kern 
County, we have found reason to question these long-held beliefs, and argue that the case for 
management might be greatly strengthened if one uses a more generalized functional form to 
represent inter-temporal preferences. As it seems unlikely that a groundwater manager’s 
behavior would conform to the case of strict time-additive separability, the case for re-
examination of the gains to groundwater management in the empirical literature is strengthened.  
The results of this paper show the need for researchers to look more closely into the 
behavioral assumptions embedded in the resource modeling tools that are commonly employed 
to investigate policy options in natural resource management. The relaxation of time-additive 
separability on the inter-temporal objective criterion has dramatic effects both on the path of 
resource extraction as well as on the calculation of gains to groundwater management, and 
should be taken investigated in all analyses that rely on the result of dynamic models. Even 
though dynamic optimization techniques have been at the disposal of resource economists for 
over 40 years, the implications of relaxing such a severe restriction on inter-temporal behavior 
have not been fully investigated, and warrant further examination if we are to continue to rely on 
dynamic resource management models for insight and guidance in answering important policy 
questions. Msangi  23  Gains to Groundwater Management 
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Appendix A: Figures and Tables 
Figure 1: Comparison of Groundwater Lift Under Central Planning  
(TAS and Recursive Preferences, r = 5%) 
 
 
Figure 2: Comparison of Groundwater Lift under Non-Cooperative Extraction 
 (Recursive Preferences, α = 0.5, r = 5%) 
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Figure 3: Comparison of Groundwater Lift under 2-Player Non-Cooperative Extraction 
 (TAS and Recursive Preferences, r = 5%) 
 
Figure 4: Comparison of Groundwater Lift under 10-Player Non-Cooperative Extraction 
 (TAS and Recursive Preferences, r = 5%) 
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Figure 5: Profile of Un-Discounted Management Gains over Time 
 (TAS and Recursive Preferences, r = 5%) 
 
 
Figure 6: Profile of Un-Discounted Management Gains over Time 
 (TAS and Recursive Preferences, r = 5%) 




Table 1: Parameters for Kern County Model 
 
Parameter Description  Value 
    
A  Area Overlying aquifer   1.26 (million acres) 
s  Specific Yield of Aquifer  0.1 
θ   Deep percolation coefficient  0.2 
e  Energy cost per unit pumping lift  $0.09 acre-ft/ft 
h1 Initial lift (depth-to-water)  220 ft 
ˆ r   Reference level for aquifer recharge  1410 ft 
ξ   Calibrating parameter for recharge eqn  0.7 
I  Average annual surface water inflow  1.90 (million acre-ft) 
a  Demand curve intercept  $92.7/acre-ft 
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Table 2: Gains in Cumulative Net Benefits to Adopting Centralized Management of 
Groundwater over Non-Cooperative Allocation   
 




Strategic Behavior  Myopic Behavior 
% of Management 
Gains Captured by 
Strategic Behavior 
      
2  $ 49/acre  $ 166/acre  71% 
  (3.3 %)  (12.2 %)   
10  $ 140/acre  $ 166/acre  16 % 
  (10.1 %)  (12.2 %)   
20  $153/acre  $ 166/acre  8 % 
  (11.2 %)  (12.2 %)   
50  $ 161/acre  $ 166/acre  3 % 
  (11.8 %)  (12.2 %)   
100  $ 163/acre  $ 166/acre  2% 
  (12.0 %)  (12.2 %)   
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Table 3: Reported Gains to Groundwater Management in Literature 
 
Authors Percentage  Gain  in  Benefits over Unregulated 
Base Case 
  
GW Use Only   
Bredehoeft and Young (1970)  (roughly) 14-16% 
Gisser and Sanchez (1980)  Nearly zero 
Feinerman and Knapp (1983)  Up to 14% 
Allen and Gisser (1984)  Nearly zero 
Worthington et al. (1985)  Up to 34% 
Nieswiadomy (1985)  0.16% to 6.5% 
Reichard (1987)  11.5% 
  
GW and SW Usage   
Noel, Gardner and Moore (1980)  (roughly) 20% 
Knapp and Olson (1995)  2.6% 




Table 4: Gains to Groundwater Management under Recursive Preferences 
 
  Total Gains from Centralized GW Management  
 (% gains) 
Inter-temporal 
Substitution Parameter 





( N = 20) 
Strategic Behavior 
( N = 50) 
Myopic Behavior 
        
1  ∞  $ 152/acre  $ 161/acre  $ 166/acre 
    (11.2 %)  (11.8 %)  (12.2 %) 
0.5  2  $ 149/acre  $ 157/acre  $ 163/acre 
    (10.9 %)  (11.6 %)  (12.0 %) 
-1  0.5  $110/acre  $ 118/acre  $ 123/acre 
    (8.0 %)  (8.9 %)  (9.1 %) 
-2  0.33  $ 77/acre  $ 85/acre  $ 91/acre 
    (5.6 %)  (6.3 %)  (6.7 %) 
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Table 5: Revised Calculation of Gains to Adopting Centralized Management  
(over Myopic Extraction of Groundwater) 
 








Simple Sum of Discounted 
Net Benefits 
Value Measured With 
Recursive Scheme
1
     
1  ∞  $ 166/acre   8 units/acre 
    (12.2 %)  (11.4 %) 
0.5  2  $ 163/acre   10 units/acre 
    (12.0 %)  (16.6 %) 
-1  0.5  $ 123/acre   22 units/acre 
    (9.1 %)  (47.7 %) 
-2  0.33  $ 91/acre   30 units/acre 
    (6.7 %)  (83.0 %) 
 
1 – these numbers are expressed in terms of the units of the utility function, rather than dollar values per acre 
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Appendix B: Optimal Policy Rule 
 
For the dynamic game, we have the optimal policy rule, which can be derived from taking the 
first-order conditions of the maximization problem embodied in the Bellman equation (2.1.4) for 
the i
th player. The optimal policy rule takes the following form 
 
    
*
12 ( i wa ϕϕ =+ −) e h
\where the parameters  1 ϕ and  2 ϕ  are defined by the relationships in (2.1.7). For the case of 
myopic extraction, the agent simply equates the marginal benefits of water with the marginal 
pumping cost of groundwater, such that we have 
 
*
i ab w e h − ⋅= 
Which ignores the carry-over value of water, which is embodied in the ‘marginal user cost’ that 
comes from the derivative of (2.1.5) with respect to the pumping variable
4. As such, the optimal 








whereas the pumping rule suggests that it should be  





















As N becomes larger, it is easy to see that the second term becomes small, however the first term 























                                                
 approaches 1 as N gets large. In so doing, the first 
term approaches the value of the myopic extraction rule, and the strategic, non-cooperative, 
dynamic game converges to a myopic extraction regime with many agents.  
 
4 Once the variable h in equation (2.1.5) is replaced with the ‘carry-over’ value of  ((1 ) ) ii hw Nwr γ − + +− − , 
this derivative can be taken with respect to    i w